I use [[ ]] to indicate translatorfs notes, and [ ] indicates supplements by the translator. ( ) [II, ] indicates words used in the volume two of the System of Value-Creating Pedagogy. { } indicates additions in the Philosophy of Value by Toda.
@@In his book gProblems on Economic Philosophyh written in 1917, Dr. Kiichiro Soda LL. D (1881-1927), the authority on economic philosophy, wrote:
gIt was in the time of Aristotle that value began to be treated as the object of study, just as other fields of learning. During the thousand years from the time of Kirchenvaeter and Scholatiker (Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, etc) through the Renaissance, the Enlightenment Movement, the nineteenth century and up to the present day, the philosophy of value has been argued pro and con.
However, the philosophy of value is still one of the problems for which a clear conclusion cannot be found. As is the case with other unsolved problems, there are some scholars who have contributed in various ways toward the philosophy of value and realize the infinite difficulty in the philosophy of value. They try to establish a new system for overcoming this difficulty, and their mental acuteness and clearness of explanation are revealed in their works.
However, they are so impatient to realize and overcome this difficulty that few scholars have come to understand the fundamental problem of why this difficulty lies in the philosophy of value. Probably herein may lie the deepest cause of difficulty in the philosophy of value. We, who are younger scholars and wish to speak something about the philosophy of value, must start from here with an attitude of studying radically the philosophy of value.h
This book is probably the first that introduced the philosophical problem of value to Japan, which has been considered extremely difficult but very important by the modern European philosophical world.
When this book was published, I studied repetitively it with all my efforts, and kept it at hand along with some of the authorfs other books. Since I found that even a sharp-witted scholar such as Dr. Soda took great pains over this difficulty, in spite of my deep respect for this book, I became so tired of the difficulty of this book as to feel myself stupid again and again. For more than ten years I have been concerned with this problem, with it constantly haunting my memory, restricting my freedom of thought and torturing myself. I wondered why the problem of value should trouble me so obstinately.
It is strange that my book gThe Geography of Human Lifeh is related to the problem of value. In that book, I tried to study the phenomena concerning the relationship between earth and human life to discover the law of cause and effect between them. It was nothing but the study of value phenomena. You can understand it clearly when you see that I analyze the concept of value in this book and define its essence as the relation-power between an evaluating subject and its object. Though I did not use the term gvalueh in that book, I was almost arriving at it unconsciously. Looking back in retrospect, I find that I had been doing a foolish thing.
Wilhelm Windelband states that in natural science one takes constantly repeated similar phenomena for the object of study and tries to formulate a general law, while in history one takes a unique individuality for the object of study and describes it. He insists that the distinction between the two fields derives from the difference in the method of study.
Heinrich Rickert took over this idea and developed it further. He states that so-called ghistoricalh science should be termed gculturalh science, because it takes a specified content called culture for the object of study. Nature is a phenomenon without value, but culture is a fact related to value. Here, value doesnft mean something which has a unique individuality but something which is related to our ideal, that is, cultural value. Rickert states that cultural science studies occurrences embodying cultural value and that even a unique phenomenon which has no relationship with the ideal of mankind is not the object of cultural science. I quite agree with this opinion, because human life is the pursuit of value, and there is no reason why the history of human life should inform us of useless event.
As the object of history is value, so the object of geography is value. Therefore, I have been concerned with the problem of value for more than thirty years. However, despite such a long and close relationship, I am ashamed to say that I have not yet satisfactorily clarified the essence of value, even though it is very difficult to solve. I think that the unknown will probably remain forever unsettled.
Why should I have been so closely concerned with the difficult problem of value that I devote myself to studying it? It is probably because my object of learning is not separated from life. gGeography of Human Lifeh studies the geographical distribution of human lifefs phenomena to discover the law of cause and effect and to discern the solidarity of various fields of society. gThe System of Value-Creating Pedagogyh pursues the law of cause and effect in the method which guides the life of the pupils. Needless to say, human life is the pursuit of value.
Therefore, in studying science which cannot be separated from human life, the problem of value is a premise which cannot be avoided. Then, even though it is very difficult to solve this problem, we cannot entrust its study only to the philosophers who are remote from actual life with an expectation of their good interpretations. This is the reason why I have been concerned with this problem for such a long time and have been devoted to the solution of this problem, though I know it to be very difficult. It is for the same reason that I strongly demand my readers to share in this painstaking effort.
We practical men are busy in restless daily life and therefore cannot spare much time for indulging in philosophical meditation. However remarkably philosophical pedagogy may progress or whatever profound truth pedagogical scholars may lecture, those practical men who should be their targets will probably be unable to understand it easily, and all their efforts will finally end in vain.
Some scholars may be angered by my words, but the below fact proves it to be true. Although the new education trend in the Meiji era (1868-1912) has undergone many changes, the changes are limited in the upper class of scholars, and the majority of practical educators of low class in the educational world were little influenced by these changes, just as the substrata of the atmosphere remain unchanged, despite agitation in the higher stratum.
However, some may say that compelling these practical men to study the problem of value is an unreasonable request even though it should be a necessary matter that must be settled first for accomplishing educational projects. It must be true in the case of philosophical study, but in the case of experiential and actually possible study we no longer find any reason for avoiding it and need not hesitate to study. This is the reason why I studied this problem deeply despite my limitations.
Therefore, when viewed from a philosophical standpoint, my consideration may appear shallow and unsophisticated. But we cannot complain much of its deficiencies, since we need a long time until the philosophersf study comes to be used for actual life. Unless we venture to establish experiential science by abandoning the confusion of conceptual philosophy, the reformation of education cannot be expected. I therefore heartily welcome any frank and actually proved criticism from practical educators.
Tsunesaburo Makiguchi
February, 1931