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Translator's note:

I use [[ ]] to indicate translatorfs notes, and [ ] indicates supplements by the translator. ( ) [II, ] indicates words used in the volume two of the System of Value-Creating Pedagogy. { } indicates additions in the Philosophy of Value by Toda.

III

[[This part III of the Philosophy of Value is mainly taken from the part V of the volume two of the System of Value-Creating Pedagogy.]]

(Value is a state of the relationship where a man and a reality are attracted to or repelled by each other. Value is qualitatively quite different from truth or falsehood which is determined by whether or not a judgment which expresses exactly a reality has universal validity. What then the elements or contents of value? These are beauty-ugliness, gain-loss, and good-evil.)
[II, Targets which everyone is attracted to from the desire of life are named goods which have good or beauty or gain. They are not called truth which expresses reality exactly.]
{The value of beauty is a sensory and momentary value which we receive through the so-called five senses, such as eyes, nose, tongue, skin, ears.}
[II, There is no important essential difference between good and gain. We can experience and recognize gain which is not good. However, because there cannot be good which is disadvantage to a society which is an evaluating subject, gain and good are of the same quality. We can only distinguish these different values by the difference of evaluating subjects. That is, we treat them as different values by the restriction on evaluating subjects.]
(The value of gain is a state of the relationship between each individual and objects which enable him to maintain and develop his life. The value of good is a result of evaluation which evaluates each individualfs voluntary action to contribute the growth and development of a unified society to which he belongs as an element.)
[II, Gain and loss are values which each individual evaluates for reality as a means for survival. Good and evil are values which a society evaluates for human voluntary action as a means for survival of a society to which each individual is unified as its element. In this case the evaluation is limited to the society.]
{Therefore, public benefit is called good. The values which produce contrary effects are called ugliness, loss, evil. Good or evil is evaluated by a society and gain or loss by an individual. Therefore, an action of an individual which produces a loss for the society to which he belongs cannot be called good, even though the action produces a gain for him.}
Also an action of good in one society can sometimes be judged as evil by another society which confronts the former. In this case, antagonism between societies, such as between nations, is judged as gain or loss, just as is the disputes between individuals.
[[The below passage is mixed with the parts of VII in II.]] The concepts of gain, beauty, and good have a certain degree of common quality. (Although each of these has a distinctive individual quality which cannot be confused with one another, they have a similar quality which can be subsumed under the concept of value.) [[from VII in II]].
[II, Some scholars donft distinguish truth from good or beauty without doubt. Naturally they do not oppose that gain-good-beauty can be subsumed the concept of value.]
(On the contrary, truth is an entirely different concept. Truth is concerned only with whether or not an expression which grasps and expresses the essence of a reality as an object is judged as a valid expression acknowledged by society in general. Truth is not concerned with the relationship between objects and our lives.) [[from VII in II]]
[II, However, value which is judged by the standard of beauty-ugliness, good-evil and gain-loss expresses a certain degree of power-relation which an object has with life of a subject. We should recognize these two are qualitatively different. In short, truth indicates whether or not there is a qualitative relationship between an expression and an object which is based on an act of cognition. On the contrary, value is to criticize what degree of power-relation which an object has to the life of a subject. These two are not of the same quality. Therefore, they cannot shift into each another. They are of different quality. Therefore, we can say true value or false value, and valuable truth or valuable reality or harmful law.]
[[In VI in the Philosophy of Value, true value or false value is denied. However the discription in VI is Toda's misunderstanding on the discription of the volume two of the System of Value-Creating Pedagogy. As Makiguchi distinguish value from truth, this argument which admits true value is valid, if etrue valuef means that an expression that something has value for a subject is true.]]
[[The below passage is from V in II]]
@ When we recognize [and express] the evaluation of beauty, ugliness, gain, or loss, the expression is true if it expresses the fact, it is false if not. In this case, the expression is concerned with the cognition {after evaluation,} not with evaluation. The expression judges on the existence or non-existence of the objective fact, and does not include subjective and emotional elements.
Therefore, truth and value are entirely different concepts, and the most important distinction lies in this: the validity of the former means the same type while that of the latter means a certain degree of the relationship. Therefore, the universal validity is qualitative in the former while quantitative in the latter. While the former simply means the same quality, the latter means the degree of relation-power which an object produces to an evaluating subjectfs life.
[[The below passage is from VII in II.]]
1. Truth
Conceptcrelated to spacecthe essence of a reality
Lawcc..related to timec..the essence of change
2. Value
Of beautyc.beautyc.beauty
Of gaincc.private gainc.gain
cc.public gainc..good
@@Is truth a concept of a thing or one of relationship? It is both. Is value a concept of a thing or one of relationship? It is not a concept of a thing but one of relationship. However, among the concepts of relationship there are some which are not subsumed under the concept of value. Value is the concept of relationship between (an evaluating subject) [II, a subject] and an object.

@

IV

[[The below passage is from the parts of VI in II.]]
I believe nothing is more harmful than the confusion of cognition and evaluation in the present world. It is because the confusion makes it hard for a person to understand, and causes him an uncertain attitude toward his choice and decision. Even among fairly high intellectuals, this confusion is observed in their daily conversation. They are unconscious of it, {discuss matters without knowing their causes,} but decide arbitrarily their likes or dislikes. {Doesnft the confusion mislead them on their thought and action?}
@@Those who hastily conclude that the spirit of the Constitution can be realized by conducting a commemorative meeting for the promulgation of the Constitution and those who think that the [Emperor Meijifs] Imperial Rescript on Education can be understood by mere solemn observance of a commemorative meeting---those people are epigones of the above-mentioned.
(Proper evaluation comes after correct cognition of the fact. Mere solemnization and deification do more harm. Nothing was ever so highly esteemed as was the Imperial Rescript on Education in the eras extending over Meiji, Taisho, and Showa. The value of the Rescript lies only in providing a minimum standard of morality in man's life, such as, gBe filial to thy parents, get on well with thy brothers, and harmonize with thy mate.h A life below this standard is not human. How to create more value is the more important question.)
[II, The Imperial Script is most respectfully treated in school. On the Four Big Holidays every year it is read aloud solemnly and textbooks for morals explain it. Though all knowledge is used in order to make it understood, and no more useful means is found now, even if it needs. Therefore, to perform the abovementioned ceremony is to realize its morality by means of encouragement without understanding what should be accomplished after understanding. If I say so, those people would mistake recognizing for evaluating and think as if I stood against Imperial Rescript on Education.]
If a pupil asks his teacher, saying, gWhat is this?h and if the teacher scolds him strictly, gDonft you understand such a thing as this yet?h, the teacher confuses obviously act of cognition with act of evaluation. A pupil asking a question does not seek an evaluation of his ability. He asks a question because he does not understand a certain matter. He is asking for instruction. An evaluation of a pupilfs ability or disability can be made at any time after understanding.
Therefore, a teacher who wants to promote a pupilfs understanding, but missing the point of the pupilfs question, turning the pupilfs attention to other things which the pupil doesnft seek, even arbitrarily threatening the pupil, doesnft understand the pupilfs mentality. Under such a teacher, backward pupils will only become worse.
When parents, brothers, and sisters instruct childrenfs homework, but scolding them because of their slow understanding, having an illusion that they can attain their aims by scolding, they confuse cognition with evaluation. {Similar cases can be sometimes observed in every class of society---in government offices, in companies, and in the factories of minor enterprises.}
There are some cases where, seeing his man doing something too stupid, a leader may scold without explanation in order to break his manfs dependence and make him ordinarily independent by arousing him a feeling of inferiority and shaming him to a certain degree. However, this is done deliberately and is different from the aforementioned thoughtless evaluation.
When we coolly argue to find the truth, we sometimes become exited gradually, finally starting a quarrel, straying from the gist of the question. {Actually, the confusion of cognition and evaluation has been forcing the world into various chaotic conditions.}

V

[[The below passage is from the parts of II in II.]]
We have explained in detail the essential distinction of truth and value. Therefore, why should they have been classified as if they were only different species within the same genus? I presume that when an erudite scholar advocates the classification, his disciples take it for granted and accept it unconditionally and at last it becomes a fixed principle traditionally. In other words, the confusion of truth and value may be ascribed to an advocacy by a scholar who confused the essence of them. The following paragraph written by Dr. Sc. Takeda may be taken as an example.
gScience progresses when different scientists investigate the same problem from different points of view. However, it may be anticipated that when different scientist investigate from different viewpoints through somewhat different methods, the results will be likewise somewhat different. Consequently, somewhat different theories may be advocated. None of them are false and each has considerable value in some cases. Even a wrestling match sometimes ends in a tie.
Therefore, when there are more than two theories, we cannot decide that all but one are false. It may be also unavoidable that when we review the theories, we cannot but feel inclined to support the theory that we like best, although we must admit that any of them may be true. Take for example the lenses of a camera. This resembles a case in which each will choose and use the type which he likes best from among several completely adjusted lenses.h
In this argument, I think the expression, gNone of them are false and each has considerable value in some casesh is valid to value but not to truth.
Truth is acknowledged through actual proof. However elaborate the explanation may be, it cannot be true unless it can be recognized as true through actual proof. In other words, it is by cognition that truth can obtain validity. Truth can be obtained only through cool intellectual act but not through emotional act. If truth which is obtained through accurate cognition were affected by our likes and dislikes, we could not admit a universally-valid truth.
On the contrary, value is of infinite varieties, varying according to the relationship between the object and the subject who evaluates it through his emotions. Therefore, an attempt to recognize truth through evaluation is fruitless, nay, recklessness itself.
Theodor Lipps says, gTruth is of such a concept that we can prove at any time through presenting a fact expressed. On the contrary, value is not of such a quality that we can prove merely through presenting a fact, even though it is an objective value which should be distinguished from a subjective one. Value is also something upon which our activity of evaluation is based and without presuming the possibility of whose existence, the basis of activity of evaluation will come to be overthrown.h
[In II, the latter part of III in the Philosophy of Valuefollows]

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