According to Nancey Murphy's ‘Introduction’ of Neuroscience and the Person----Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, (edited by Robert John Russell, the Founder and Director of The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences (CTNS) in California, Nancey Murphy, et al.), Pope John Paul 2 called for “an interdisciplinary collaboration of scholars to seek a fruitful concord between science and religion in 1979. Responding to this call, the Vatican Observatory, in Italy, sponsored a number of events, culminating in a major international conference in September 1987. (The proceedings of this conference are published in Physics, Philosophy and Theology: A Common Quest for Understanding, 1988 ed. by R. J. Russell, G. V. Coyne, et al..) George Coyne, Director of the Vatican Observatory, then proposed a series of five conferences for the decade of 1990s and invited CTNS to become a cosponsor. It became apparent that one theological problem was integrally related to many of the more specific topics; this is the problem of how to understand the role of divine action in the natural world. Thus, the problem of divine action became the organizing theological theme for the series, to be considered from the point of view of a variety of recent scientific advances.” (Murphy 1999-1, p. i)
Papers from these serial conferences were published as follows. (I only named N. Murphy from the editors.)
1, Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature. Murphy.
2, Chaos and Complexity. Murphy.
3, Evolutionary and Molecular Biology.
4, Neuroscience and the Person. Murphy.
5, Quantum Physics and Quantum Field Theory.
This trend continued at Fuller Theological Seminary in California, known for its conservative evangelicalism. Its Graduate School of Psychology had several conferences to discuss the relationship between science and faith. The achievements were published in Whatever Happened to the Soul? in 1998. The contributors had a new common opinion about the soul-body problem.
Murphy states in the ‘Preface’ of the Book, "This book is for greater resonance between science and faith. … One core theme … is a monistic, or holistic, view of humans. In order to avoid confusion with reductionistic or materialistic forms of monism, we have chosen the label ‘nonreductionistic physicalism’ to represent our common perspective. Thus, statements about the physical nature of human beings made from the perspective of biology or neuroscience are about exactly the same entity as statements made about the spiritual nature of persons form the point of view of theology or religious traditions. We would disavow the opinion that human science speaks about a physical being, while theology and religion speak about a spiritual essence or soul. … We have written from the perspective that views soul as a functional capacity of a complex physical organism, rather than a separate spiritual essence that somehow inhabits a body." (Murphy 1998-1, p. xiii)
I cited a dualistic opinion from the Roman Catholic catechism in the argument on Crick, "What is the soul? The soul is a living being without a body, having reason and free will." For a long time this is Roman Catholic's official opinion that a neurophilosophers attack, but the contributors have a different opinion about the mind-body problem. Though I admire their book Whatever happened to the Soul? , I don't know what will happen to their souls. Now let's consider their opinion written by Murphy's papers.
Murphy thinks it important to reject reductive physicalism in order to save our ordinary understanding of ourselves. She states in her paper ‘Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical Issues’ in the above book, "The question of causal reduction seems to be the one that matters for retaining our traditional conception of personhood. First, if mental events can be reduced to brain events, and the brain events are governed by the laws of neurology (and by the laws of physics), then in what sense can we say that humans have free will? … Second, if mental events are simply the product of neurological causes, then what sense can we make of reasons? … It seems utter nonsense to say that these judgments are merely the result of ‘the blind forces of nature’. If free will is an illusion and the highest of human intellectual and cultural achievements can be counted as the mere outworking of the laws of physics, this is utterly devastating to our ordinary understanding of ourselves." (Murphy 1998-3, p. 131)
In her paper ‘Human nature: historical, scientific, and religious issues’ in the same book, Murphy states, "Today scientists and philosophers suppose that the person is but one substance --- a physical body. … Neuroscience has completed the Darwinian revolution. … Nearly all of the human capacities or faculties once attributed to the soul are now seen to be functions of the brain.” (Murphy 1998-2, p. 1) Language, emotion, decision-making are explained by the brain activity.
Although neurophilosophers and neuroscientists argue for reductive physicalism, or materialism, she rejects it and argues for nonreductive physicalism. She explains it, saying, “ 'Physicalism' signals our argument with the scientists and philosophers who hold that it is not necessary to postulate a second metaphysical entity, the soul or mind to account for human capacities and distinctiveness.’Nonreductive' indicates our rejection of contemporary philosophical views that the person is nothing but a body." (ibid, p. 2)
She thinks that it is crucial for nonreductive physicalism to "explain how we can claim that we are our bodies, yet without denying the higher capacities that we think of as being essential for our humanness; rationality, emotion, morality, free will, and most important, the capacity to be in relationship with God." (ibid)
To argue for nonreductive physicalism, Murphy uses a philosophical debate on the mind-brain identity, saying, "An important distinction in philosophy of mind is that between ‘type identity’ and ‘token identity’. Token identity is the thesis that every particular mental event or property is identical with 'some' physical event or other; type identity is a stronger thesis to the effect that 'every' type of mental event is identical with a type of physical event. So, for instance, a type of sensation, such as pain, is identical with a particular type of neuron firing. Type identity entails the reducibility of the mental descriptions to physical descriptions. … This strong identity thesis may be unobjectionable in cases such as pain sensations, but it runs into problems with higher-order mental states such as believing some proposition." (ibid, p. 10)
She uses Donald Davidson's argument for nonreducibility, saying, "This distinction between type and token identity theories makes it possible to state the difference between reductive and nonreductive materialism or physicalism. … Because there are no type identities between the mental and the physical (no psychophysical laws), the mental cannot be reduced to the physical. Donald Davidson’s ‘anomalous monism’ is the best-known current version of nonreductive physicalism. He claims that there are no strict laws at the mental level; beliefs are related instead by principle of rationality. Because there are causal laws at the physical level, beliefs must be only token identical with brain states." (ibid, p. 11)
She explains this difference by using an argument for the emergent property of our consciousness in her paper ‘Nonreductive physicalism: philosophical issues’. She insists, “Higher human characteristics such as morality, rationality, and the ability to enter into personal relationships cannot be reduced to evolutionary advantage, or genetic endowment, or neurobiology. … These features are emergent properties. … Recognition of genetic factors in human behavior does not entail genetic determinism." (Murphy 1998-3, p. 127)
The point is the determinism. It is true that neuroscientists can show that if a certain part of the brain is damaged, a certain faculty of human mind becomes lost. But they cannot show that such and such an activation of a certain part of the brain causes determinately such and such concrete knowledge, belief, imagination, will, or others that are mental states of higher level.
But, even if such determinism is possible, there is another possible account for mental state. Murphy explains it in a case of free will. She discriminates different views of free will, saying, "An incompatibilist view maintains that free will is incompatible with a determinist view of the natural world. A compatibilist view maintains that human freedom means being able to act as one chooses. It is relevant whether one's choices themselves can be shown to be a product of prior causes of certain sorts. The important issue is whether our choices are determined by the kind of factors that we believe to be operative, or whether we are self-deceived. … The mental-level description is compatible with causal determinism at the neurobiological level." (ibid, pp. 138-139)
Although Murphy believes that physical determinism is unsuccessful, she wants to keep mental property from physical property even if physical determinism turns out to be true.
She uses another argument about the different reductionisms, saying, "Causal reductionism is the view that the behavior of the parts of a system is determinative of the behavior of all higher-level entities. … All causation in the hierarchy is ‘bottom-up’. … The law pertaining to higher sciences in the hierarchy should be reducible to the laws of physics. … One (ontological reductionism) is the view that as one goes up the hierarchy of levels; no new kinds of metaphysical ‘ingredients’ need to be added to produce higher-level entities from lower. No ‘vital force’ or ‘entelechy’ must be added to get living beings from nonliving materials, no immaterial mind or soul is needed to get consciousness." (ibid, p. 129)
She characterizes reductive physicalism, saying, "(Reductive physicalism, or materialism, adds to the ontological reductionism) that only the entities at the lowest level are really real, higher-level entities---molecules, cells, organisms---are only composites of atoms." (ibid)
She argues for nonreductive physicalism, saying, "It is possible to hold ontological reductionism without subscribing to this thesis of reductive physicalism. Thus, one might want to say that higher-level entities, such as human beings, are real---as real as the entities that compose them---and at the same time reject all sorts of vitalism and dualism. … (Nonreductive physicalism has) the acceptance of ontological reductionism, but the rejection of causal reductionism and reductive materialism. It denies the existence of nonmaterial entities, the mind (or soul) but does not deny the existence of consciousness or significance of conscious states or other mental phenomena. … The human nervous system … is the seat of consciousness and also of human spiritual or religious capacities. Consciousness and religious awareness are emergent properties and they have top-down causal influence on the body." (ibid, pp. 129-131)
As Murphy is Professor of Christian Philosophy at Fuller Theological Seminary, she has to defend her nonreductive physicalism from both neurophilosophers and traditional dualist theologicians.,br> She states, "A serious theological problem awaits solution. Philosophers see dualism as no longer tenable; the neuroscientists have completed the Darwinian revolution, bringing the entire human being under the purview of the natural sciences. Scientists and philosophers alike associate dualism with Christianity. … If the only options were dualism or the reductive materialism, … Christians would face a major intellectual crisis. Our claim is that these are not the only options; a third position exists that is not only theologically and biblically sound but consistent with current philosophy and science as well." (Murphy 1998-2, p. 24)
She enumerates four possible options about the mind-body problem as follows.
“1, Radical dualism: the soul (or mind) is separatable from body, and the person is identified with the former.
2, Holistic dualism: the person is a composite of separable parts but is to be identified with the whole, whose normal functioning is as a unity.
3, Nonreductive physicalism: the person is a physical organism whose complex functioning, both in society and in relation to God, gives rise to ‘higher’ human capacities such as morality and spirituality.
4, Eliminative/reductive materialism: the person is a physical organism, whose emotional, moral, and religious experiences will all ultimately be explained by the physical sciences.”(ibid, pp. 24-25)
Out of these four options, she selects 3, saying, "While 2 is consistent with much of Christian teaching, we have judged it worthwhile to consider the plausibility of 3, nonreductive physicalism, in that it is clearly more compatible with developments in science and philosophy." (ibid, p. 25)
Against the option 1, she points out a new theological movement in her paper ‘Neuroscience and theology’ in Reading the Universe through Science, Religion and Ethics: The Evolving Science and Religion Debate edited by C W du Toit. (Murphy 1999-2)
According to her, "Critical church history in the modern period has recognized significant doctrinal development. One important aspect of this has been reorganization of the Hellenization of Christian thought---the 'translation' of doctrines into the thought-forms and language of Greek culture. This movement led to questions being raised whether body-soul dualism was in fact biblical teaching.
There is somewhat less agreement on New Testament conceptions of human nature. Most scholars now agree that the New Testament generally supports a holistic and physicalist account.
However, some argue that it presupposes dualism since there are a few passages that appear to support a doctrine of 'the intermediate state' after death. Christians are assumed that between death and the general resurrection they survive to await judgment.
But another passage said that Jesus gave up his spirit. This passage can mean there is no spirit after death. Moreover, a different interpretation of the intermediate state is possible. Because God is not 'in time', those who are with God after death are therefore not in time, either. Therefore Christians need not have a spirit after death to await judgment." (ibid, p.?)
Against Murphy's nonreductive physicalism, there can be some arguments. A neurophilosophers, Patricia Churchland argued against emergent property theory in her Neurophilosophy. There she summarized property dualism, saying, "Even if mind is the brain, the qualities of subjective experience are emergent with respect to the brain and its properties. Subjective experience, goes the argument, has a character and a quality uniquely and irreducibly mental." (Patricia Churchland, p. 323)
She started with examining the meaning of ‘emergence’. She says, "It has often been claimed that the blueness of water is emergent to the microphysics of H2O molecules, on the grounds that no amount of microphysical information could allow us to predict or to deduce that liquid aggregates of such molecules would have the peculiar qualitative character we call ‘blue’. Blueness may systematically co-occur with aggregates of H2O molecules, … but is emergent. … But this argument is not sufficient to explain emergent property. It is the complex property of H2O molecules that proves to have all of the causal powers of blueness. This microphysical property affects human observers in all the same ways as does blueness. So the blueness of water is not causally an emergent property. “(ibid, pp. 325-326)
I think Patricia's example is not a good one for the argument against emergent property. If I imagine that I hear God's voice, what physical property affects me in all the same way as imaginary voice? If she finds out its cause in the brain, why physical cause in water molecules in case of sensation, while one in the brain in case of imagination? So Patricia's example is flawed in trying to argue against emergent property.
As Ramachandran points out, I feel vivid visual reality about things near me. But when I call something to mind, I cannot feel vivid reality, even if I believe in its existence. Vivid reality may belong to sensation, not to thinking, believing, and imagination. This is one usage of ‘reality’, and it has nothing to do with problem of existence.
However, in philosophy ‘reality’ has ontological meaning related to dualism, physicalism and spiritualism. So they can say, "What you feel vivid reality about does not really exist." But I cannot understand well what this sentence means. Does this sentence mean that I feel nothing? Maybe not.
A neuroscientist can apply meaningfully this sentence to a Charles Bonnet patient. In this case it means as such, "You say you now really see a rabbit on the doctor's lap, but we really see no rabbit on his lap. You must have a hallucination." In this case if the patient has learned his syndrome, he will try not to believe in his hallucination by reasoning.
In another case, a neuroscientist can use this sentence to a phantom limb patient, meaning, "You say you feel real pain in your left arm, but we cannot see really your arm. You must have a delusion." But in this case the pain felt by the patient can be unendurable, and he may request a painkiller.
In another case, a neuroscientist can use this sentence to a denial patient, meaning, "You say you really hear your hands clapping, but we really see only your right hand moving. You must have self-deception." In this case it is difficult for the patient to admit her paralysis.
In any case, the sentence can have a meaningful usage in the above concrete situations.
In what situation does a philosopher use this sentence? Mainly he uses it in his job of making a unified worldview. If he is a reductive physicalist, he may use it, meaning, "You say you really see a box on the table, but it is ‘really’ consists of atoms that both you and I cannot see ‘really’. If you cannot understand a theory of atoms, your understanding about the box is not sufficient or wrong."
In this usage the former‘really’ has nothing to do with seeing, sensation in the latter ‘really’. It modifies a verb phrase ‘consist of’. However, I wonder if there is a meaningful difference between ‘consist of’ and ‘really consist of’. I can only understand that by using ‘really’ the physicalist emphasizes the sentence.
I think that ‘reality’ has merely nothing to do with ontological argument in philosophy but also is misleading about making a unified worldview. Making a worldview belongs to thinking, while feeling reality belongs to sensation and hallucination. It may be impossible for a philosopher to feel reality in his worldview even if he can believe in it. If he feels reality, then he may have hallucinations.
The debate between neurophilosophers and nonreductive physicalists may be interesting for some persons. However, for many people it must be difficult and boring. For the result of the debate leads to deny or approve religious thought.
According a research(Anderson1999), the percentage of persons who believe in some religious thoughts and deny evolution theory is a few higher than that of those who have a compatible view, and by far higher than that of those who believe in evolution theory and deny religion.
Though many people enjoy products created by science, they seem to be unwilling to abandon religious thoughts and behaviors. There are many reasons why people believe in religion or spiritual thought. Some reasons are social and others are cultural. Ramachandran suggests that there can be evolutionary reasons, physical mechanisms in the brain for religion.
Compared with these reasons, philosophical ontological debate may give only a minor insight on human thoughts and behaviors. I think that though philosophers treat emergent property of consciousness as ontological property, it has its roots in pragmatic property.
We cannot know subtle relations between mind and body (brain), but we think that the belief system about the self or folk psychology has been useful. In case of brain damages and psychological disorders we quest the scientific research, but usually we go on with folk psychology. Many people cannot find any critical defect in folk psychology.
In folk psychology, we assume that we have a unified self with reason and fee will. This assumption is useful for social behaviors. We believe that we can control our behaviors by controlling our reason and will. So the emergent property theory has pragmatic meaning.
However, we cannot find any useful scientific device that controls our behaviors by controlling our brain. If science can create some brain-manipulating devices with which we can make our behaviors better, then the reductive physicalism will get pragmatic meaning.
If it happens, traditional folk psychology and religion may change dramatically. If someone feels unhappy, science can make him or her happy by changing his/her brain state. It looks like the SF movie ‘Matrix’. However, I wonder if people wish such devices.
Moreover, we had a disastrous example. In Aum Shinri-kyo the leaders wished devices for controlling their spiritual minds. They used hallucinatory drugs for their followers’ initiations to make sensitive to religious hallucinations. They invented electric headgears known as the PSI (perfect salvation Initiation) that were believed to have power to enhance the spiritual states and to implant Asahara’s thought patterns into the followers. Neurophilosophers want to destroy religion, but ironically their achievements can be used for prosperity.
Anderson, M.L. (1999) ‘Christ and Evolution: Handling the Faculty Dilemma’ in Reading the Universe through Science, Religion and Ethics: The Evolving Science and Religion Debate, ed. by C.W. du Toit. University of South Africa.
Crick, Francis. (1994) The Astonishing Hypothesis---The Scientific Search for the Soul. Touchstone, New York.
Churchland, Patricia. (1989) Neurophilosophy---Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Churchland, Paul. (1995) The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul---A philosophical Journey into the Brain. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Murphy, Nancey. (1998-1) ‘Preface’ in Whatever Happened to the Soul? --- Scientific and Theological Portraits ofHuman Nature, ed. by W. Brown, N. Murphy and N. Malony.Fortress Press.
Murphy, Nancey. (1998-2) ‘Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and Religious Issues’ in the above book.
Murphy, Nancey (1998-3) ‘Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical Issues’ in the above book.
Murphy, Nancey. (1999-1) ‘Introduction’ in Neuroscience and the Person --- Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. By R. Russell, N. Murphy, T. Meyering, and M. Arbib. Vatican Observatory Publications, Vatican City State.
Murphy, Nancey. (1999-2) ‘Neuroscience and Theology’ In Reading the Universe through Science, Religion and Ethics:The Evolving Science and Religion Debate, ed. by C.W. du Toit. University of South Africa.
(Unfortunately I cannot quote page numbers because I didn’t copy this book at Harvard University.)
Ramachandran, V.S. and Sandra Blakeslee. (1998) Phantoms in the Brain. Quill William Morrow, New York.
This paper is based on the presentation that was spoken at the Reischauer Institute for Japanese Studies, Harvard University, on September 24, 2002. I greatly appreciate much kindness that Prof. Helen Hardacre and Coordinator Galen Amstutz gave me during my visit.